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Abstract
In this paper we study long run economic growth as a sequence of accelerations,
slowdowns and crises, and estimate the role of institutions and macroeconomic policies
in determining this sequence. We determine the joint eﬀect of policies and institutions
on the frequency of the four growth regimes: stable growth, stagnation, crisis and
miracle-like fast growth. The results conﬁrm the importance of institutions for growth
but also show that macro-policies; inﬂation, trade openness, size of government and
real exchange rate overvaluation matter for the growth process, even after controlling
for institutional quality. Importantly, some policies aﬀect regimes diﬀerentially; for ex-
ample, trade makes episodes of fast growth more likely but also increases the frequency
of crises. Finally, the eﬀects of policies are nonlinear and dependent on the quality of
institutions. For example, government spending reduces growth in countries with good
institutions but can increase it when institutions are weak.
1 Introduction
Several recent papers have documented a large degree of within-country variation in the
process of economic growth. For example, Hausmann et al. (2005) look for episodes of
growth acceleration during 1950-2000 and ﬁnd many such episodes even in countries that
have under-performed during this period in terms of average growth. Similarly, Jerzmanowski
(2006) identiﬁes four distinct growth regimes and ﬁnds that periods of fast growth are possible
even in countries with very low quality of institutions; what keeps average long run growth
rates low is the inability of these countries to sustain growth. This approach highlights the
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2complex nature of growth and implies that understanding long run growth requires studying
the process of “growth transitions”, i.e. switches between episodes of growth acceleration,
stagnation and collapse. This paper studies the role of institutions and macroeconomic
policies in determining the frequency of such episodes. We ask whether policies, like control
of inﬂation or government spending, and institutions, such as rule of law or democracy,
aﬀect how frequently an economy goes through prolonged stagnation or experiences periods
of rapid growth. Since in the long run, these frequencies determine average growth rates, the
paper also re-examines the relationship between policies and long run growth. The question
whether macroeconomic policies such as inﬂation, government spending, real exchange rate
overvaluation, and trade openness matter for long run economic growth has a long history in
empirical growth literature. Early research on determinants of growth in a cross-section of
countries found signiﬁcant eﬀects of macroeconomic policies on long run growth (e.g. Barro
1991, Dollar 1992, Sachs and Warner 1995). Recent literature is more skeptical. Easterly
and Levine (2003) argue that after controlling for institutions, policies do not aﬀect the level
of income. Easterly (2005) shows that the ﬁndings of signiﬁcant eﬀects of policies on growth
are driven by extreme outliers. Finally, Acemoglu et al. (2003) argue that once institutions
are controlled for, policies do not matter much for growth and volatility. The approach taken
in this paper allows us to re-examine the question of policies and growth, while explicitly
accounting for within-country variation in the growth process. This framework is richer
than the standard average growth analysis since it allows policies to work through multiple
channels by diﬀerentially aﬀecting the likelihood of growth accelerations, stagnation and
crisis.
The particular approach taken here builds on Jerzmanowski (2006) who estimates a
regimes switching model of growth. According to his estimates a country’s long run growth
is determined by the frequency of visits to four growth regimes: stable growth, stagnation,
crisis, and miracle growth. The stable regime corresponds to the growth experience predom-
inant among developed economies, with long run average growth of about 2 percent, the
stagnation regime is characterized by no growth on average, the crisis regime is an episode
of large shocks to growth and ﬁnally the miracle regime corresponds to episodes of fast
growth of about 6% per year.1 Countries change regimes randomly according to probability
distributions, which depend on the quality of institutions. Good institutions increase the
frequency of visits to favorable regimes but most importantly make them more persistent;
countries with weak institutions are capable of growth take-oﬀs, however, they are unable
to sustain them. The long run growth rate (and growth volatility ) depend on the within-
regime growth dynamics, as well as the long run ergodic distribution of regimes. The present
paper asks how macroeconomic policies, in addition to institutions, aﬀect this distribution.
We use the regime probabilities obtained by Jerzmanowski (2006) to estimate the eﬀects of
policies on the frequency of the four growth regimes. That is, rather than asking whether
a particular policy is correlated with average growth, we asks whether the policy is associ-
ated with the country spending more time in periods of growth, stagnation or crisis. This
allows us to exploit the within-country variation in the growth process which is removed by
averaging over time. It also allows policies to have an eﬀect on growth through diﬀerent,
1These regimes also diﬀer with respect to persistence of shocks and volatility of growth, as will be described
below.
3perhaps oﬀsetting, channels. For example, large governments may reduce the likelihood of
fast miracle-like growth but also limit the probability of a crisis. The net eﬀect on average
growth may be small leading us to the incorrect conclusion that government size has no
eﬀect on the long run growth process. In addition, using a multinomial probability model to
estimate the probabilities of growth regimes allows for nonlinear and interdependent eﬀects
of policies and institutions.
The results conﬁrm some of the existing ﬁndings, namely that institutional quality is a key
determinant of long run growth, as well as Easterly’s ﬁnding that only extreme values of the
distortionary policies (inﬂation rate and real exchange rate overvaluation) have a signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect on growth. However, macro policies, especially trade openness and the size of
government also matter for changes in growth patterns and thus inﬂuence the average growth
and volatility in the long run. Crucially, the policies also diﬀer in the channel through which
they aﬀect long run growth. For example, trade lowers the probability of stable growth
and increases that of a crisis, while also making miracle growth more likely. The size of
government, on the other hand, lowers the chances of miracle growth, while increasing the
probability of stable growth at moderate rates. In addition, the eﬀect of policies depend
in an important way on the quality of institutions. In general, low quality of institutions
makes economies more vulnerable to the harmful eﬀects of inﬂation and real exchange rate
overvaluation. In some cases the direction of the eﬀect is actually reversed; trade appears
to be conducive to growth for countries with good institutions and detrimental to growth
for countries with bad institutions. The size of government has the opposite eﬀect - it
lowers growth when combined with good institutions and increases it with weak institutions.
Finally, when we extend the analysis to the eﬀects of political institutions by including a
measure of democracy among the explanatory variables, we ﬁnd that, similarly to the rule
of law, democracy increases the frequency of stable growth. Unlike rule of law, however,
democracy signiﬁcantly lowers the chances of miracle growth take-oﬀs. We also ﬁnd that
accounting for democracy removes the negative eﬀect of initial income on the probability of
miracle growth, i.e. the convergence eﬀect. This suggest that political economy, in addition
to diminishing marginal product of capital or technological catch-up, is an important channel
of convergence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the idea of growth regimes, describes
the approach to identify them and outlines the empirical approach. Section 3 presents and
discusses the results and the ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Growth and Regime Switching
Following earlier contributions by Easterly et al. (1993) and Pritchett (2000) several recent
papers have focused attention on growth transitions, i.e. changes in the long run growth
process. Hausmann et al. (2005) develop a methodology for identifying growth accelerations,
deﬁned as an increase in trend growth by more than 2% for seven years, with the resulting
growth above 3.5%, and ﬁnd that these episodes are quite common. They report that
economic reforms are correlated with sustained accelerations, whereas shocks tend to produce
short-lived growth. However, many growth accelerations do not appear to be spurred by any
obvious changes in standard growth determinants, while many instances of reform fail to
4produce fast growth. Jones and Olken (2008) use the Bai-Perron test to detect structural
breaks in the per worker output growth series and show that growth accelerations are mainly
total factor productivity accelerations, while growth slowdowns are due to both capital and
TFP slowdowns, with the latter playing a greater role. Finally, Jerzmanowski (2006) uses
the regime switching approach to identify distinct growth regimes and the dynamics of
transitions between them.
To illustrate the idea of growth regimes consider the following simple example. Suppose
that there are only two possible states of the world - one in which the economy stagnates
and another in which it grows at 3% per year. If over time a country switches between
regimes, growth will be an uneven process. This is of course what growth looks like for many
countries, for example Japan accelerated in the 1950’s and 60’s and the stagnated in the
1990’s while India grew slowly until it took-oﬀ in the 1990’s. If we further assume that these
transition probabilities depend on some country-speciﬁc characteristic X (e.g. quality of
institutions), we have a model where country characteristics, such as policies or institutional
quality, shape long run growth by aﬀecting the frequency of the two regimes.
Within a standard approach to growth, if a characteristic X is “good” for growth then
countries with a high level of X are expected to be growing fast (say, at 3% per year)
and countries with low levels of X are expected, all else equal, to be growing slowly (say,
stagnate); this is a world where “you either have what it takes for growth or you don’t”.
In the regimes approach having high X means more frequent episodes of growth; however,
both the low and high X countries will stagnate from time to time. A stylized illustration
of the switching process of growth for two countries is presented below in Figure 1.
Country one has a lower level of the growth-conducive characteristic X , and so it spends
more time in the stagnation regime. However, it is capable of periods of fast growth. In
fact, when it is growing, it grows as fast as country two. Of course, country two with high X
visits the growth regime more frequently, and so in the long run it will grow faster. However,
it too stagnates from time to time. What determines the long run growth performance of
an economy is the within-regime dynamics (3% vs.0 ), and the frequency of visits to the two
growth regimes.
The growth regimes approach calls for identifying the regimes as well as the properties of
transitions, including the set of X’s and their eﬀect on regime changes. Jerzmanowski (2006)
applies the framework of Markov-switching regression to identify the regimes. Assuming
that there are four regimes, each with a distinct AR(1) growth process leads to the following
model2
yˆit = αst + βst yˆit−1 + ε
st
it , (1a)
εstit ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2st), (1b)
where yˆt i is the growth rate of country i in period t and st indicates the regime that is
in eﬀect at time t, that is for every t, st ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
2Unfortunately the correct number of regimes cannot be tested with the simple likelihood ratio test. See
Hamilton (1996) for discussion and references. The informal procedure followed by Jerzmanowski (2006)
was to start with two regimes and increase the number of regimes as long as all estimated regimes appeared
distinct.
5Figure 1: A stylized illustration of the switching process of growth. Some country-speciﬁc
characteristic X makes the growth regime more likely (e.g. good institutions). Country one
has low value of X and so it spends more time in the stagnation regime. However, it is
capable of periods of fast growth. Country two has high X and so it visits the growth regime
more frequently. However it too stagnates from time to time.
The growth process is fully characterized by the above within regime dynamics (1) and
the evolution of regimes, which is assumed to follow a 4-state Markov process where the
transition probabilities are allowed to depend on the country’s quality of institutions. That
is, P{sit = k | sit−1 = j} ≡ pjk = pjk(zi) for j, k = 1, ..., 4, where zi is a measure of the
quality of institutions in country i. This model is estimated using maximum likelihood (see
Jerzmanowski (2006) and the Appendix for details). The resulting estimates consist of the
within-regime parameters( α’s, β’s, and σ’s), the parameters of the transition matrix pjk(zi)
for j, k = 1, ..., 4, and the inference about regimes st for t=1,...T. We discuss them in turn.
Table 1 shows the parameter estimates. Each of the four AR(1) processes implies a diﬀer-
ent long run growth rate, i.e. the average growth rate that would obtain if the economy were
to remain in that regime indeﬁnitely, given by α/(1− β) and shown in the last column. No-
tice that the these average long run growth rates (from which we derive the regime labels) do
not fully characterize the regimes. In addition to the long run average performance, regimes
diﬀer signiﬁcantly in volatility of growth (σ) and persistence of growth shocks (β).3 The sta-
3Note that the within-regime persistence of the growth process β, say 0.3761 for the stable growth regime,
should not be confused with the persistence of the stable growth regime itself. The former is assumed to
be a common to all countries property of the stable growth process, whereas the latter depends on the
6ble regime corresponds to the growth experience predominant among developed economies,
with long run average growth of about 2 percent. The volatility is relatively low and there
is a great deal of persistence in the growth process. The stagnation regime is characterized
by no growth on average and larger volatility of growth shocks. In this regime, periods of
growth and decline occur but are not very persistent. The crisis regime is an episode of large
shocks to growth. While these shocks tend on average to be negative reﬂecting economic
crises, the dispersion is very large and positive shocks are also possible. These shocks have
no persistence. Finally, there exists the regime of fast, miracle-like growth with an average
long run growth of 6% and modest volatility.
Constant (αs) AR Coeﬀ. (βs) Std. Dev.(σs) Long run Growth
Stable Growth 0.0132∗∗ 0.3761∗∗ 2.11% 2.12%
Stagnation 0.0010 0.1799∗∗ 4.56% 0.12%
Crisis −0.0101∗∗ -0.0045 13.16% −1.00%
Miracle Growth 0.0536∗∗ 0.1417∗∗ 2.71% 6.25%
Table 1: Within regime estimates of yˆt i = αst + βst yˆt−1 i + ε
st
ti , and ε
st
ti ∼ i.i.d. N(0, σ2st)
for each of the four states. The ﬁrst column shows the constant term, the second is the
autoregressive coeﬃcient and the third is the estimate of the standard deviation of the error
component. The last column shows the implied long run growth. A ∗ denotes signiﬁcance
at 10% level, ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
The estimated transition probabilities imply that institutions are more important in
sustaining growth than in igniting it. In particular, low quality of institutions countries have
signiﬁcant probability of entering growth regimes, however, the probability of exit is high.
In the long run regimes follow an ergodic distribution where low quality of institutions leads
to frequent stagnation and crisis whereas high quality, while not ruling out stagnation or
crises, reduces their frequency and increases that of the growth regimes. Figure 2 shows the
ergodic distribution of time spent in each of the four regimes.
Even if the true value of the parameter vector were known we would not be able to
tell with certainty which regime was in eﬀect at any particular moment since regimes are
unobservable. However, conditional on the model, the estimated parameters and all the
observations for a given country, we can form inference about the probability of the regimes
during the sample period. These smoothed probabilities, denoted by Pˆ (st = j|YmT ), where
YmT stands for the entire time series for country m, give us an estimate of the likelihood of
each of the four regimes for country m at all sample dates t. For example, Pˆ (s1979 = 1|YUS T )
country-speciﬁc transition probabilities, which will be discussed below.
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Figure 2: Ergodic probabilities of the four regimes as functions of the quality of institutions.
tells us the (conditional) probability that the US was in the stable growth regime in 1979.
Figures 3 and 4 plot examples of the smoothed regime probabilities.
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9Table 2 below presents the smoothed probabilities averaged over the sample period 1970-
94 for each of the regimes for a selected group of countries. That is, for each country the ﬁrst
column gives the average probability of the stable growth regime (1/T )
∑T
l=1 Pˆ (sl = 1|YT ),
the second column gives the average probability of stagnation (1/T )
∑T
l=1 Pˆ (sl = 2|YT ), and
so on. These probabilities tell us what is the average (over sample years) probability that a
country was in a given regime. For example, on average the probability that Japan was in
the miracle growth regime is 33% while the average probability that it was stagnating is 5%.
country Stable Growth Stagnation Crisis Miracle Growth Growth
Hong Kong 0.04 0.17 0.06 0.72 5.56%
Japan 0.62 0.05 0.00 0.33 4.31%
Thailand 0.13 0.33 0.03 0.51 4.36%
Portugal 0.51 0.13 0.01 0.36 3.92%
Malaysia 0.31 0.24 0.03 0.42 3.48%
Egypt 0.50 0.40 0.05 0.06 2.20%
India 0.37 0.51 0.03 0.09 2.10%
USA 0.89 0.07 0.00 0.03 2.04%
Mexico 0.52 0.35 0.02 0.11 1.68%
Chile 0.05 0.45 0.16 0.34 1.64%
Zimbabwe 0.05 0.72 0.15 0.08 1.03%
New Zealand 0.74 0.21 0.01 0.04 0.90%
Bolivia 0.45 0.43 0.08 0.03 0.10%
Cote d’Ivoire 0.02 0.61 0.15 0.22 0.07%
Table 2: The columns report average smoothed probabilities of regimes, i.e. the estimates
of regimes’ likelihood based on the entire sample. Let Pˆ (st = 1|YT ), the smoothed in-
ference about the likelihood that regime one was in eﬀect in period t. Column one is
(1/T )
∑T
l=1 Pˆ (sl = 1|YT ), column two is (1/T )
∑T
l=1 Pˆ (sl = 2|YT ) and so on.
In order to study the joint eﬀect of institutions and policies on growth through their
eﬀect on regimes changes, one could follow the same approach as Jerzmanowski (2006) and
extend the vector z in the transition probabilities matrix P (z) to include measures of policy.
In practice, the estimation is quite computationally intensive even with only one variable.
Instead, we use the inference about likelihood of regimes obtained from the estimation of the
above model (i.e. the smoothed probabilities) to calculate the average frequency of visits to
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each of the four regimes, as in Table 2. We assume that the averages frequencies approximate
the ergodic regime distribution and use them to compute the average number of occurrences
of each regime during the sample period. We then ask how country characteristics, such
as quality of institutions and macroeconomic policies, aﬀect the regime probabilities. In
particular, we average the estimated probabilities over two subperiods 1970-82 and 1983-
1994 and run a pooled multinominal logit. To check the robustness of the results we also
estimate several linear speciﬁcations and report them in the Appendix. If, as was assumed
by Jerzmanowski (2006), quality of institutions is the only variable determining transition
probabilities, we would expect to replicate the estimates of the relationship between the er-
godic distribution of regimes and institutional quality presented in Figure 2, with departures
from this distribution purely random and unrelated to policies. Alternatively, if policies do
matter, they will add additional explanatory power in ﬁtting the observed regime distribu-
tions. Note that we are not studying the direct eﬀect of policies on regime changes but
instead we ask what is their eﬀect on the long run distribution of the frequency of visits to
each regime. This means that if we ﬁnd that a certain policy increases the fraction of time
spent in stagnation we will not be able to tell whether this is because the policy increases
the persistence of stagnation or because it makes transition to stagnation from other regimes
more likely. Unbundling the eﬀect of policies in this way is an important next step and is
left for future research.4
3 Results and Discussion
This section presents the empirical model and the results. We discuss the results and their
relation to existing evidence and theories of economic growth. We also consider extending
the model to account for diﬀerences along the political dimension of institutions.
3.1 Results
To determine the relationship between policies and institutions and regime frequencies we
estimate the following multinomial logit model.
Pr(regime = j)i =
exp(Xi βj)∑4
s=1 exp(Xi βs)
, (2)
(3)
for j = 1, 2, 3, and 4. Pr(regime = j) is the average probability of regime j during the
sample periods, and Xi is a vector of country speciﬁc characteristics including initial income,
quality of institutions and four policy measures: log of average inﬂation, real exchange rate
overvaluation, share of government’s consumption in GDP and trade to GDP ratio. Quality
of institutions is measured using the rule of law index from Kaufmann et al. (2003). Policy
variables are averaged over the relevant period and are taken from World Bank economic
4See Kerekes (2009) for an alternative way to extend the approach in Jerzmanowski (2006) to multivariate
transition probabilities.
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indicators, except the real exchange rate overvaluation, which comes from Dollar (1992).
Table 8 in the appendix describes the data.
This model is a simple multinomial logit model with 4 (unordered) outcomes: stable
growth, stagnation, collapse and miracle growth. Of course, as discussed above, we don’t
not actually observe whether a country is in a given regime in any given year but instead
we have the (estimated) probabilities of regime occurrences. To proceed with the logit
estimation we convert the data on regime probabilities into counts of regime occurrences by
multiplying the probabilities by the number of years in the sample. For example, the data
in Table 2 corresponds to the period 1970-94 and so multiplying the entries in the ﬁrst row
we attribute to Honk Kong one year of stable growth, four years of stagnation, one year of
crisis, and 17 years of miracle growth.5
We estimate the above model using pooled data for subperiods 1970-82 and 1983-94.
Since the coeﬃcient estimates are not easily interpreted we do not report them here, instead
we tabulate the estimated marginal eﬀects at the median. Below we also examine how these
eﬀects vary over the entire distribution of the right hand side variables. This is important
since, as Easterly (2005) points out, there are often signiﬁcant outliers in the policy measures.
Table 3 shows the marginal eﬀects of institutions, policies and income on the probability
of each of the four regimes for a hypothetical country with all the right-hand side variables
equal to the sample median (we refer to it as “median country”). The quality of institutions
increase the probability of favorable outcomes - miracle growth and stable growth, while
reducing the chances of unfavorable regimes - stagnation and crisis. The size of government
lowers the likelihood of miracle growth but compensates by increasing the chances of stable
growth and reducing the probability of stagnation and crisis. Trade lowers the probability
of stable growth while increasing that of miracle growth; it also increase chances of crisis
and stagnation. Both distortionary policies, inﬂation and real exchange rate overvaluation,
increase the chances of stagnation and crisis and lower the chances of stable growth but
the eﬀect of inﬂation is not statistically signiﬁcant. Their eﬀect on miracle growth is also
insigniﬁcant. Finally, the level of development as captured by initial income has an indepen-
dent inﬂuence on regimes; it lowers the probability of miracle growth, which is the familiar
convergence eﬀect, albeit in a probabilistic sense. That is richer countries are less likely
to grow at very rapid rates as predicted by the neoclassical model as well as technology
catch-up models. This eﬀect is, however, mitigated by the fact that income also increases
the chances of stable growth. Higher income countries also appear to stagnate less and have
less frequent crises.
We can use the marginal eﬀect to calculate the change in the probability of each regime
given a one standard deviation change in the right hand side variables. These results are
displayed in Figure 5.
Clearly, institutions not only deliver the desirable eﬀects (more frequent growth states,
less stagnation and crises) but quantitatively also have a large impact. However, the eﬀects
5An alternative strategy, would be to estimate a linear model of the log odds-rations, which are given
by ln(Pr(regime = j)i/Pr(regime = 4)i = Xi βj for j = 1, 2, 3. where we have normalized β4 = 0. Here we
could use the probabilities of regime occurrences (Table 2) without the need to compute regime counts. This
approach gives very similar results but has the disadvantage of considerably over-predicting (in sample) the
probability of miracle growth and we do not pursue it.
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Variable Stable Growth Stagnation Crisis Miracle Growth
Rule of Law 0.202*** -0.199*** -0.064*** 0.060***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.012) (0.015)
Inﬂation -0.110 0.058 0.015 0.037
(0.100) (0.073) (0.014) (0.027)
Overvaluation -0.310*** 0.240*** 0.043** 0.026
(0.065) (0.057) (0.018) (0.031)
Gov’t 2.086*** -0.806** -0.056 -1.224***
(0.445) (0.394) (0.153) (0.400)
Trade -0.434*** 0.228*** 0.046 0.161***
(0.072) (0.071) (0.032) (0.034)
Initial Income 0.132*** -0.078*** -0.018** -0.035**
(0.028) (0.025) (0.008) (0.016)
Table 3: Multinomial logit: marginal eﬀects at the median. Standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels:* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
of government size and trade openness are also nontrivial but they are, to some extent, oﬀ-
setting across regimes. For example, a one standard deviation increase in trade share means
3.5% more time spent growing fast and 10% less time growing at moderate stable rates.
To translate the eﬀects on probabilities of regimes into eﬀects on long run growth we can
multiply the eﬀects from Figure 5 by the average long run growth numbers for each regime,
reported in Table 1. We can perform a similar calculation for volatility of growth. The
results are shown in Table 4. Note that the median growth rate in the sample was 1.46% ,
so that for the median country a one standard deviation improvement in rule of law results
in growth increasing to 2.38% (1.46 + 0.92). On the other hand, a one standard deviation
increase in government’s size results in growth falling to 1.26%. This relatively small change
is a net eﬀect of the oﬀsetting forces; larger government leads to less miracle growth but also
less stagnation and more stable growth. Overall, we can conclude that at the median the
eﬀect of institutions on growth is much greater than that of any policy.6 This reﬂects two
ﬁndings. First, institutions do have a quantitatively large eﬀect on growth, and second, for
some policies the eﬀects on long run growth are oﬀ-setting across regimes. Similarly, note
that despite evidence of convergence (richer countries are less likely to grow very fast) poor
6Policies aﬀect volatility more than average growth but again institutions are more important.
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Figure 5: Eﬀects of a one standard deviation change in the right-hand side variables on long
run regime probabilities. All right-hand side variables set to the sample median.
countries do not grow faster than rich ones. This is because at lower income levels they are
also more susceptible to prolonged periods of stagnation.
Variable Growth Volatility
Rule of Law 0.922 -1.270
Inﬂation -0.037 0.149
Overvaluation -0.188 0.388
Gov’t -0.200 -0.195
Trade -0.004 0.294
Initial Income 0.029 -0.387
Table 4: Change in the average growth rate and volatility in response to one standard
deviation change in the right hand side variables. In % points.
Of course, the above calculations do not fully characterize the eﬀects of policies as these
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are nonlinear and depend on the value of other explanatory variables. That is, the eﬀect
of inﬂation may be much diﬀerent when it is close to the median level (as in the table
above) than when it is in the hyperinﬂation range. Similarly, the eﬀect on inﬂation may be
diﬀerent in countries with diﬀerent quality of institutions. Finally, the distributions of the
right hand side variables may be skewed so that a one standard deviation change (as in the
table above) may be large or small relative to realistic changes in these variables. To get a
better understanding of these eﬀects we will graph them for the entire distribution of the
right hand side variables. We will also look at whether the eﬀects diﬀer signiﬁcantly across
countries with diﬀerent institutional environments.
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Figure 6: Probability of Stable Growth for the “median country”.
Figure 6 shows plots of the probability of the stable growth regime as functions of the
six explanatory variables. In each box the probabilities are calculated by setting the value of
ﬁve variables to the sample median and varying the remaining variable over the percentiles
of the sample distribution. The ﬁrst box shows that for a median country the probability
of stable growth is increasing with income. With low income the long run probability of
growing at stable rates is one-third, while for the richest country it is 60%. The quality
of institutions also improves the chances of stable growth (box two), however, the eﬀect is
small in the lower part of the institutions’ distribution, it rises sharply around the median,
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and ﬂattens out again around the 60th. Inﬂation (box three) has very little eﬀect except
for values above the 88th percentile of the distribution where it signiﬁcantly lowers the
likelihood of stable growth. This corresponds to 0.287 log inﬂation or about 33% annual
rate of inﬂation. Notice that while the eﬀect of inﬂation on stable growth is consistent with
the idea that only extreme values of inﬂation matter, the threshold is not exceedingly high.
Real exchange rate overvaluation has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect throughout the distribution
but similarly to inﬂation the eﬀect is much more pronounced beyond the 88th percentile,
which is an overvaluation of 47%. The size of the government increases the chance of stable
growth; the estimates imply that going from 10% of government consumption in GDP to
20% increases the long run probability of stable growth from 40% to 60%. Finally, trade
lowers the probability of stable growth; quantitatively the estimates imply that increasing
the trade to GDP ratio from 36% to 96% results in the long run likelihood of stable growth
falling from 60% to 20%.
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Figure 7: Probability of Miracle Growth for the “median country”.
Figure 7 shows the probabilities of the miracle growth regime for a median country.
Income lowers the chance of fast growth reﬂecting convergence but the eﬀect is not very
large. As with stable growth, institutions have a positive eﬀect which again is steepest in
the middle of the distribution. Inﬂation matters only above the 88th percentile where it
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lowers the chances of miracle growth. Real exchange rate overvaluation does not appear to
have a large eﬀect. Government size signiﬁcantly reduces the probability of a growth miracle;
increasing the share of government consumption from 10% to 20% reduces the probability
from 15% to only 5%. Finally, greater trade openness appears to increase the chances of a
growth take-oﬀ.
Note that in none of the boxes does the probability of miracle growth exceed 20%. In
fact, a hypothetical country with all the right hand side variables set to the most miracle-
growth conducive values is predicted to spend 55% of time in miracle growth regime - below
actual values for countries like Hong Kong (72%) and Korea (86%). Of course, neither of
these countries had the hypothetical perfect policy mix and consequently the model predicts
they should spend even less than 55% of time in miracle growth. We conclude from this
that while institutions and policy variables do aﬀect the likelihood of miracle growth, there
are other factors at work (including possibly pure chance). Section 3.5 below looks at the
political dimension of institutions - democracy. It turns out that accounting for both the
rule of law and political institutions improves the ﬁt of the miracle growth regime.
Figures 15 and 16 in the appendix show the probability of stagnation and crises, respec-
tively. Both income and quality of institutions signiﬁcantly lower the chances of stagnation
and crisis. The eﬀect of income is particularly pronounced in the case of crisis; a median
country beyond the 60th percentile in either the income or the rule of law distributions has a
negligible probability of crisis. Values of both inﬂation and real exchange rate overvaluation
above their respective 88th percentiles increase the chances of stagnation and crisis, with
overvaluation increasing them slightly even at lower levels. Larger government consumption
lowers the probability of stagnation and has no eﬀect on the likelihood of crisis. Finally,
trade increases the frequency of crises and also, interestingly, increases the probability of
stagnation. Recall that stagnation is a regime where periods of growth are not unlikely;
however, they tend not to be sustained and are, in the long run, oﬀset by equally frequent
periods of decline, leading to zero long run average growth.
Because of the nonlinear nature of the probability model the eﬀects of one variable depend
on the level of the remaining variables. The above calculations were performed keeping those
remaining variables at the sample median. It is however interesting to ask how the eﬀects
change when we alter the value of some of the other variables. In particular, some authors
have investigated the relationship between the quality of institutions and the eﬀects of various
other country characteristics on growth(e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000, Serven et al. 2005).
Aghion et al. (2004) show that the relationship between ﬁnancial openness and volatility
may depend on the degree of development of ﬁnancial markets, which is presumably highly
correlated with measures of institutions such as protection of property rights - a part of the
rule of law index.7 The ﬁgure below show plots of the miracle growth regime probabilities,
calculated as above, for two hypothetical economies: one with the sample’s highest value of
quality of institutions (solid line) and another with the sample’s lowest (dashed line). All
other variables remain at the median level.
Figure 8 compares the probabilities of the miracle growth state. The large gap between
the two lines indicates how much higher the probability of the miracle regime is for countries
7Similarly, Aghion et al. (2008) provide a model and some evidence showing that the eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy on growth again depend on the development of ﬁnancial markets.
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Figure 8: Probability of Miracle Growth for good (solid line) and weak (dashed) institutions
countries.
with good institutions. With the exception of inﬂation, policies have very diﬀerent eﬀects
depending on the quality of institutions. Exchange rate overvaluation, which appears to
have no eﬀect for countries with weak institutions, increases the chances of miracle growth
for countries with good institutions. The opposite is true for the size of government; while
it appears to have little eﬀect when institutions are weak, it greatly reduces the likelihood
of fast growth where institutions are strong. Finally, trade does not aﬀect the probability of
fast growth with weak institutions but greatly increases it with good institutions.8
8Plots for the other regimes are presented in the appendix (Figures 18 and 19). The main ﬁndings are
that: (1) greater share of government consumption in GDP reduces the probability of stagnation for weak-
institutions countries, while also increasing, albeit by much less, the chances of a crisis, (2) trade signiﬁcantly
increases the probability of a crisis but only for countries with weak institutions, and (3) extreme inﬂation
increases the chance of a crisis everywhere, but the eﬀect is much stronger with weak institutions.
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3.2 Long Run Growth
We can take the approach used to construct Table 4 and translate the eﬀects in Figures 6
- 8 into eﬀects on long run growth and volatility. First, consider again a country with all
variables except that of interest set to the sample median (the “median country”) without
distinguishing between high and low quality institutions.
10th Percentile Median 90th Percentile
Inﬂation 0 0 −−
Real Exchange Overvaluation − − −−
Government Spending − − +
Trade − − −
Rule of Law + ++ 0
Initial Income + + 0
Table 5: Eﬀect on long run growth at the 10th percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile
of variables’ distribution. Eﬀects are categorized as strongly negative (−−), negative (-),
negligible (0) , positive (+), and strongly positive (++).
Figure 9 shows the eﬀects of policies on long run growth for the median country (The
qualitative summary is presented in table 5). Inﬂation does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect growth
as long as it remains below the 88th percentile or about 33%, however, instances of extreme
inﬂation have a devastating eﬀect on growth. Exchange rate overvaluation, especially when it
is extremely high, lowers growth. The size of the government initially lowers growth and then
raises it but the overall eﬀect is small. This is a result of two oﬀsetting forces aﬀecting the
median country. As government size increases the likelihood of miracle growth falls, however,
so does the probability of stagnation, and the probability of stable growth rises signiﬁcantly.
This suggests that otherwise identical countries with diﬀerent sizes of government may grow
at similar rates but the nature of the growth process will be diﬀerent. Countries with lower
size of government will go through periods of stagnation but will also enjoy periods of fast
growth. Countries with higher size of government are more likely to grow at moderate but
uninterrupted rates.
Figure 10 shows the eﬀect of initial income and quality of institutions. As could be
anticipated from the eﬀects on regime probabilities, institutions have a stronger eﬀect on
long run growth than any of the policies examined in Figure 9. Note however, that the eﬀect
is greatest around the median of the quality of institutions distribution. While the levelling
oﬀ could well be expected at high levels of institutional quality, the relatively smaller eﬀect
for low quality of institutions is not obvious. It suggests the existence of a “threshold eﬀect”
with regards to institutions and casts doubt on the possibility of a sustained acceleration of
growth in weak rule of law countries by gradual improvement of institutions.
Figure 11 contrasts the long run growth eﬀects of policies for countries with good (solid
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Figure 9: Eﬀects of policies on growth in the “median country”.
Figure 10: Eﬀects of initial income and institutions on growth in the “median country”.
line) and weak institutions(dashed line). The plots show growth relative to that of a country
with all variables set to the sample median. Weak institutions appear to make economies
more vulnerable to the damaging eﬀect of real exchange rate overvaluation and high inﬂation.
The size of government lowers growth for countries with good institutions in the entire range,
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while for countries with weak institutions it lowers growth, albeit less strongly, below median
and raises it sharply above the median. As discussed above, this is a consequence of the
diﬀerential eﬀect of government on the likelihood of stable growth versus miracle growth - it
increases the former while lowering the latter. For good-institutions countries, where stable
growth is the most likely regime this lowers average growth. However, for weak-institutions
countries, where stagnation dominates, stable growth is rare and miracle growth is even
rarer, it raises growth.
Trade’s eﬀect on growth also depends on institutions; it is positive when institutions are
good but turns strongly negative when they are weak. The beneﬁcial eﬀect of trade is to
increase the likelihood of miracle growth while the cost is the increase in a probability of a
crisis. The former eﬀect is very strong with good institutions but virtually nonexistent with
weak ones (Figure 8). The latter on the other hand is insigniﬁcant for countries with good
institutions and quite strong for weak institutions (Figure 19 in the appendix).
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Figure 11: Eﬀects of policies on growth for good (solid line) and weak (dashed) institutions
countries. The vertical axis measures growth relative to an economy where all variables are
equal to the median.
These results, summarized in Table 6, suggest that the relationship between policies
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and institutions is potentially quite complex and goes beyond the view that bad policies are
merely a manifestation of weak institutions, which are the ultimate determinants of economic
development (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2003).
10th Percentile Median 90th Percentile
Inﬂation Good Inst. 0 0 −
Weak Inst. 0 0 −−
Real Exchange Overvaluation Good Inst. 0 0 0
Weak Inst. − − −−
Government Spending Good Inst. − − −
Weak Inst. − 0 ++
Trade Good Inst. + + +
Weak Inst. − − −
Table 6: Eﬀect on long run growth at the 10th percentile, the median, and the 90th percentile
of variables’ distribution; good institutions vs. weak institutions. Eﬀects are categorized as
strongly negative (−−), negative (−), negligible (0) , positive (+), and strongly positive
(++).
The four growth regimes diﬀer not only with respect to average growth rates but also
volatility of the growth process. Below we present the estimated eﬀects of policy variables on
the volatility of growth. Figure 12 shows the eﬀects for the median country. Only extreme
values of inﬂation raise volatility signiﬁcantly while both real exchange rate overvaluation and
trade increase volatility at all levels. The size of the government tends to reduce volatility,
especially above the median of the sample distribution. This is the eﬀect of trading-oﬀ fast
growth for stable growth seen before.
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Figure 12: Eﬀects of policies on volatility in the “median country”.
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3.3 Discussion
The most interesting results can be summarized as follows: (1) Institutions have a strong
eﬀect on growth and volatility but this eﬀect is also nonlinear; it is greatly diminished for
both very high quality of institutions and, more surprisingly, for very low quality of institu-
tions. (2) Macro policies have a smaller, but non-negligible, inﬂuence on the growth process.
While only extreme values of inﬂation and real exchange rate overvaluation aﬀect growth,
government size and trade have signiﬁcant eﬀects even at the median. There are, however,
oﬀsetting forces governing the eﬀects of the latter two policy variables. While government
size increases the likelihood of stable growth and reduces that of a crisis, it also limits the
economy’s ability to grow very fast. On the other hand, trade increases the chances of mir-
acle growth but also makes crises more frequent. (3) The eﬀects of macro policies depend
on the quality of the underlying institutions. In general, weak institutions make economies
more vulnerable to the adverse eﬀects of high inﬂation and exchange rate overvaluation.
Moreover, government size is harmful to growth in countries with good institutions while
it is conducive to growth in countries with weak institutions. Trade on the other hand, is
conducive to growth in countries with good institutions while it is harmful to growth in coun-
tries with weak institutions. That is, there may not be a“one-size-ﬁts-all” growth strategy.
(4) While there is evidence of the convergence eﬀect - lower income increase the probability
of miracle growth, there is also a countervailing eﬀect - high income (independently of the
quality of institutions) makes stable growth more likely and reduces frequency of crises.
The beneﬁcial eﬀect of institutions is consistent with the large body of evidence from cross
country growth studies as well as most theories that model the link between the protection of
property rights and growth (e.g. Murphy et al 1993). However, the ﬁnding that at low levels
of institutions improvements in their quality lead to relatively small growth gains is new.
It suggests that incremental institutional reform as the key to sustained growth is unlikely
to succeed in countries with very low initial quality of institutions. It suggest a possibility
of an institutional poverty trap. Similarly, the positive eﬀect of trade on miracle growth
is consistent with the idea that trade fosters technology transfer and enhances eﬃciency.
On the other hand, the adverse eﬀect of trade - manifested through greater likelihood of
crisis and stagnation is consistent with many theoretical models suggesting negative eﬀects
of trade on development (Young 1991, Mountford and Galor 2008). Trade may, for example,
lead to specialization in a few sectors resulting in less diversiﬁcation and greater potential
for crisis. In addition, specialization in sectors with limited potential for learning by doing
or technology transfer may result in long run stagnation.9 The results further imply that
good institutions appear to allow the economy to reap the beneﬁts of trade while minimizing
the adverse eﬀects.10 Larger government, usually found to be detrimental to growth (Barro
1991) is also identiﬁed as having two oﬀsetting eﬀects. First, it lowers the chances of fast
growth. This could be because of crowding out of private investment or because large
government leads to greater distortions, a higher degree of intervention, large and ineﬃcient
9Recall that stagnation is a regime where periods of growth are not unlikely; however, they tend not to
be sustained and are, in the long run, oﬀset by equally frequent periods of decline, leading to zero long run
average growth.
10See Chang, Kaltani and Loayza (2005) for similar empirical ﬁndings and some theory.
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state sector, limits on competition, etc. However, large government size also makes the
economy more stable and less prone to stagnation. Note that this implies that an optimal
policy for an open economy may involve maintaining a large government. This is in fact what
Rodrik (1998) ﬁnds in the data. It is also consistent with his explanation, namely that large
government oﬀsets the volatility due to external shocks. Again, the relative strength of the
two opposing eﬀects of government size depends on the quality of institutions. With good
institutions the negative eﬀect dominates and government size is harmful to long run growth.
With weak institutions, however, the positive eﬀect may dominate making government size
conducive to growth. One potential explanation of this ﬁnding relies on the idea of weak
and strong states. In a recent paper Acemoglu (2005) builds a model with self-interested
rulers of various degree of economic power (ability to tax).11 He argues that economically
weak states are detrimental to growth because self-interested rulers are unlikely to invest in
growth-enhancing infrastructure and provide public goods (for e.g. courts, law enforcement,
etc.) with no prospect of appropriating the fruits of growth. On the other hand, strong states
may also be detrimental to growth by excessively taxing or otherwise expropriating citizens
and thereby eliminating incentives to invest and innovate. If we view the size of government
as a proxy for the strength of the state, the present ﬁndings are consistent with the idea that
in countries with weak rule of law beneﬁts from stronger states dominate; perhaps because
weak rule of law discourages private provision of infrastructure or other public goods. On
the other hand, in countries with strong rule of law the negative side of strong state is more
powerful.12
In a recent paper Aghion et al. (2008) argue that eﬀects of ﬁscal policy may depend on
the degree of development of ﬁnancial markets. In the model they present volatility has a
negative eﬀect on growth in a credit constrained economy because it decreases investment
in long term innovative projects. Counter-cyclical ﬁscal policy, by limiting volatility, may
thus be conducive to growth in countries with weak credit markets. They provide evidence
in support of this conclusion using a panel of OECD countries. The present paper uses
data on developed as well as developing countries and does not use a speciﬁc measure of
counter-cyclicality of ﬁscal policy. However, we can, in a loose and somewhat indirect way,
compare the present results with their paper. It may appear that our results are similar since
we ﬁnd that the size of government, which may capture at least the potential for stabilizing
ﬁscal policy, does appear to promote growth in countries with weak rule of law, an aspect
of institutions crucial for development of ﬁnancial markets. However, the mechanisms seems
diﬀerent from the one proposed by Aghion and his co-authors since higher average long run
growth is a result of greater frequency of stable growth and lower frequency of stagnation.
11Acemoglu also considers political power (ability to stay in oﬃce)
12Another explanation of this diﬀerential eﬀect may be that government provides public goods (e.g. infras-
tructure) and its size is only detrimental to growth beyond a certain threshold (see Barro 1990) and it is the
rich/good-institutions countries that have the largest governments. However, in our sample the correlation
between size of government and rule of law index is only 0.36. Alternatively, the explanation may lie with the
diﬀerent composition of spending between countries with high and low qualities of institutions. However, the
pattern of the eﬀects of government on the diﬀerent regimes suggest that the explanation has to do with the
stabilizing role of large government (lower probability of crisis) and its ability to avoid prolonged stagnation,
on the one hand, and the detrimental eﬀect on the possibility of miracle growth take-oﬀs, on the other.
25
The likelihood of fast miracle-like growth, which presumably would increase with faster rate
of innovation, actually declines with larger government.13 Note ﬁnally, that the ﬁnding that
large government may be conducive to growth when institutions are underdeveloped, com-
bined with the relatively weak eﬀect of improving institutions when their quality is very
low, may suggest maintaining large government while building institutions as a growth max-
imizing strategy for low quality of institutions countries. When institutions are suﬃciently
good the country would switch to “small government” policy. This is similar to Aghion et
al (2004) idea of appropriate institutions, whereby at early stages of development limiting
competition may be optimal. As in their case, this policy may run into political economy
problems when government incumbents resist a switch to a policy that limits their power.
Finally, the level of income seems to have an independent eﬀect on regime probabilities.
It lowers the likelihood of miracle growth but also increases the chance of stable growth and
reduces those of a crisis. These eﬀects are consistent with various convergence mechanisms
(diminishing returns, technology diﬀusion) as well as with the idea that greater development
allows greater diversiﬁcation (e.g. Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997).
3.4 Robustness and Relation to Growth Regressions
Two important questions may be posed about the above analysis. First, are the results
robust to the various modeling choices made (the Markov-switching model for probability
detection, the multinomial logit model for regime probabilities, etc.). Second, how diﬀerent
are these result from standard growth regressions estimated using average growth rates.
The issue of robustness is explored more fully in the appendix, which uses linear probability
speciﬁcations as well as an alternative regime detection method to obtain very similar results
(it also attempts a rudimentary endogeneity correction with the linear speciﬁcations). Here
we present one of the linear speciﬁcations highlight the distinctness of the above results from
conventional growth regressions.
Columns 2-5 of Table 7 present the results of a linear (panel) probability model estimated
using the same data as the multinomial logit above. Obviously, this speciﬁcation does not
allow for the nonlinearities discussed above but the average eﬀects appear similar to those
reported for the logit model. We again ﬁnd the diﬀerential eﬀect policies across regimes,
for example the size of government increase the chances of stable growth but lowers that of
miracle growth while trade shows the opposite pattern. To contrast this with the conventional
approach, the ﬁrst column reports the estimate of a standard growth regression (i.e. one with
average growth on the left-hand side) using the same data. The results reﬂect the standard
ﬁndings in the literature, in particular we ﬁnd no eﬀect of government size or trade and a
signiﬁcant and negative eﬀects of initial income. Thus it appears that averaging growth over
episodes of fast growth, stagnation, stable growth and crises makes us miss the rich pattern
of the eﬀects government size, trade openness and initial income on the growth process.
13In a similar spirit, Aghion et al. (2006) argue that development of ﬁnancial markets mitigates the
negative eﬀects of exchange rate volatility on growth. In one of their empirical speciﬁcations they show that
the eﬀect of the real exchange overvaluation is harmful to growth at lower levels of ﬁnancial development but
turns positive at higher levels. Again this is consistent with the eﬀect of overvaluation of growth in panel
two of Figure 11, if we treat rule of law as a proxy for the development of ﬁnical markets.
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Variable Avg. Growth Stable Growth Stagnation Crisis Miracle Growth
Rule of Law 0.012∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.003) (0.058) (0.035) (0.021) (0.033)
Inﬂation −0.009∗∗∗ -0.050 0.006 0.010 0.033
(0.003) (0.084) (0.043) (0.043) (0.031)
Overvaluation −0.018∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.084 -0.022
(0.006) (0.102) (0.072) (0.050) (0.047)
Gov’t -0.028 1.556∗∗∗ −0.568∗∗ 0.063 −1.051∗∗
(0.049) (0.635) (0.333) (0.397) (0.610)
Trade 0.005 −0.328∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.021 0.171∗∗
(0.007) (0.130) (0.077) (0.043) (0.102)
Initial Income −0.012∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗ -0.042 -0.018 −0.045∗
(0.003) (0.058) (0.041) (0.016) (0.028)
R2 0.31 0.55 0.58 0.38 0.13
N 118 110 110 110 110
Table 7: Panel. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels:*
5%, ** 1%.
If countries with diﬀerent sizes of government do not grow at signiﬁcantly diﬀerent rates
over longer periods of time, it is not because government size does not matter for growth,
as the convectional regressions suggest, but because government has oﬀsetting eﬀects by
facilitating slower but stable growth at the expense of rapid accelerations. Knowing this
is obviously important for understanding economic growth, both from the theoretical and
practical perspective, but it is something conventional regressions cannot inform us about.
For example, if we can determine what about government spending makes stagnation less
frequent, and what makes miracle growth less likely, we are in better position to design
growth-promoting policies.
3.5 Democracy
The above analysis used a measure of the rule of law as an indicator of institutional quality.
The rule of law, while itself a fairly broad concept, captures only a limited, if important,
aspect of institutional environment. Given the recent consensus on the importance of insti-
tutions in the process of development there is a growing interest in “unbundling” institutions
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- i.e. studying in greater detail the eﬀects of diﬀerent aspects of institutions and the chan-
nels through which they aﬀect development. One such unbundling would be a separation
of “economic” institutions, i.e. those that have to do with protection of private property,
enforcement of contracts, etc. from political institutions, i.e. the way in which government
is chosen and what constraints on its actions exist. This section attempts such unbundling
by treating the rule of law index as a measure of “economic” institutions and extending the
above analysis by including a Polity IV measure of democracy alongside the rule of law in
the set of explanatory variables.14 This decreases the sample size somewhat so we decide to
treat this analysis in separation from the above main results.
The question about the relationship between democracy and development is an old one
and a consensus in the literature has emerged suggesting that democracy may have little
eﬀect on development (Tavares and Wacziarg 2001) or an inverted U relationship with growth
(Barro 1996). These results are usually explained by arguing that democracy has both
positive and negative eﬀects on growth. In particular, Tavares and Wacziarg show that
democracy fosters accumulation of human capital, but retards that of physical capital and
increases the size of the government. The resulting net eﬀect on long run growth is slightly
negative. In the context of the present approach it is therefore natural to ask whether
democracy aﬀects the likelihood of growth regimes diﬀerently (and possibly in an oﬀsetting
fashion). Another motivation for extending the list of explanatory variables comes from the
fact that the model does not do a good job at explaining miracle growth. Figure 20 (in the
appendix) shows a plot of the ﬁtted versus actual probabilities of miracle growth. Clearly,
the model severely underestimates the likelihood of sustained miracle growth of the kind we
have observed in several East Asian countries. It turns out that controlling for the level of
democracy improves the model’s performance considerably as can be seen in Figure 21 in
the appendix.
The inclusion of democracy does not change the estimated eﬀects of policies substantially
so we omit their exposition and focus on the eﬀects of the rule of law, level of income and
democracy.15 Figure 13 below shows the estimated eﬀects, evaluated at the median, of a
one standard deviation change in initial income and the rule of law index from the model
without democracy (these are the same estimates as in ﬁgure 5 and table 4).
As discussed above, rule of law increases the probability of good regimes (miracle and
stable growth) while income increases the likelihood of stable growth and lowers that of
stagnation but also decreases the frequency of miracle growth (convergence eﬀect). Figure
14 shows the eﬀects in a model with democracy included among the explanatory variables.
Democracy increases the likelihood of stable growth and the estimated eﬀects of rule
of law and income are now reduced. Democracy also slightly increases the probability of
stagnation and has a negative eﬀect on the chance of a crisis that is similar in magnitude to
that of rule of law. Most importantly, however, democracy signiﬁcantly lowers the likelihood
14In practice the variable rule of law aggregates information on protection of property right, contract
enforcement as well as some aspect of the judiciary and the overall level of crime and violence.
15One interesting change is that the eﬀect of the rule of law on growth does not ﬂatten out at high levels,
i.e. it goes from being S-shaped (see ﬁgures 6-16) to being J-shaped. It suggests that the ﬂattening out was
a consequence of the correlation between democracy and rule of law.
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Figure 13: Eﬀects of a one standard deviation change in initial income and rule of law index
on long run regime probabilities. All right-hand side variables set to the sample median.
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of miracle growth episodes. Furthermore, once democracy is accounted for, income has a
positive and small eﬀect on the probability of miracle take-oﬀ. That is richer countries are less
likely to grow rapidly because they are more democratic. This suggests that the convergence
eﬀect uncovered before works mainly through the political economy channel and not through
standard channels such as diminishing marginal product of capital or technological catch-
up.16 This is consistent with the view of Olson (1982) who argued that democratic societies
may stagnate in the long run due to the detrimental eﬀect of special-interest groups which are
able to organize and lobby for ineﬃcient policies. Overall, the results imply that democracy
favors the middle at the expense of extremes - either very fast growth or severe crises.
4 Conclusions
Recent empirical growth literature has documented a large degree of within-country vari-
ation in the process of economic growth (Hasumann et al. 2005, Jones and Olken 2008,
Jerzmanowski 2006). Growth appears to be a sequence of accelerations, slowdowns and cri-
sis rather than a smooth process, which is well characterized by the long run average alone.
This approach highlights the complex nature of growth and implies that understanding long
run growth requires studying the process of “growth transitions”, i.e. switches between pe-
riods of growth acceleration, stagnation and collapse. The present paper contributes to this
literature by analyzing the role of institutions and macroeconomic policies in these tran-
sitions. Within this framework it also reexamines the link between policies and long run
growth and is thus related to the the recent literature, which ﬁnds little association between
macroeconomic policies and growth once institutions are accounted for (e.g. Acemoglu et al
2003, Easterly 2005).
The approach we take builds on Jerzmanowski (2006), who identiﬁes four growth regimes:
stable growth, stagnation, crisis and miracle growth. We estimate a multinomial logit and
examine the joint eﬀect of policies and institutions on growth through their eﬀects on fre-
quencies of visits to the four regimes. The results conﬁrm some of the existing ﬁndings,
namely that institutional quality is a very important determinant of long run growth, as
well as Easterly’s ﬁnding that only extreme values of the inﬂation rate have a signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect on growth. However, macro policies; inﬂation, trade openness, size of govern-
ment, and real exchange rate overvaluation also matter for changes in growth patterns and
thus inﬂuence the average growth and volatility in the long run. Crucially, the policies also
diﬀer in the channel through which they aﬀect long run growth. For example, trade lowers
the probability of stable growth and increases that of a crisis, while also making miracle
growth more likely. The size of government, on the other hand, lowers the chances of miracle
growth, while increasing the probability of stable growth at moderate rates. In addition, the
eﬀects of policies depend in an important way on the quality of institutions. In general, low
quality of institutions makes economies more vulnerable to the harmful eﬀects of inﬂation
and real exchange rate overvaluation. In some cases the direction of the eﬀect is actually
16Note that to the extent that Lipset hypothesis holds, i.e. democracy increases with income, this eﬀect
will still lead to the standard convergence, whereby poor countries are catching up to the rich. However, see
Acemoglu et al (2008) for evidence against the Lipset hypothesis.
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reversed; trade appears to be conducive to growth for countries with good institutions and
detrimental to growth for countries with weak institutions; it raises volatility regardless of
institutions. The size of government has the opposite eﬀect - it lowers growth when com-
bined with good institutions and increases it with weak institutions. Extending the model
to include a measure of the political institutions we ﬁnd that democracy favors the middle
at the expense of extremes - either very fast growth or large crises.
The next step should be a more detailed analysis of the role of policies in the dynamic
process of changing regimes rather than just in determining the average time spent in each
regime as was done here. As the results with democracy highlight, a further unbundling
of institutions should be pursued. It should also be noted that the measure of institutions
used here together with initial income and policy variables have limited power to explain
the probability of fast miracle-like growth. Accounting for democracy improves this aspect
of the model’s performance but other factors omitted from the present analysis may also be
important determinants of miracle growth.
While the estimated eﬀects of policies are smaller than that of institutions, the latter
eﬀect is strongest around the median of the institutions distribution and is less powerful
for countries with exceptionally weak institutions. On the other hand, the joint inﬂuence
of policies on growth and volatility and thus welfare is not negligible. Moreover, the recent
evidence linking institutions to events in distant past, such as colonial experience, suggests
that institutions are diﬃcult and slow to change. Thus the moderate eﬀects from policies
might be the best that can be achieved, at least at reasonable time horizons.
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Figure 15: Probability of Stagnation for the “median country”.
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Figure 16: Probability of Crisis for the “median country”.
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Figure 17: Probability of Stable Growth for good (solid line) and weak (dashed) institutions
countries.
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Figure 18: Probability of stagnation for good (solid line) and weak (dashed) institutions
countries.
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Figure 19: Probability of crisis for good (solid line) and weak (dashed) institutions countries.
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Figure 20: Fitted versus actual frequency of miracle growth regime in the baseline model
(without democracy).
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Figure 21: Fitted versus actual frequency of miracle growth regime in the model with
democracy.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rule of Law 0.48 1.07 -1.10 2.17
Inﬂation 0.21 0.44 0.01 3.22
Gov’t Size 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.38
Overvaluation 0.03 0.35 -0.90 1.93
Trade 0.55 0.24 0.12 1.35
Initial Income 9.46 0.89 7.54 10.70
Probability of Stable Growth 0.50 0.39 0.00 0.98
Probability of Stagnation 0.33 0.27 0.02 0.91
Probability of Crisis 0.08 0.13 0.00 0.69
Probability of Miracle Growth 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.94
Table 8: Descriptive statistics.
B Robustness
The above analysis relied on the particular model adopted to detect and classify growth
patterns (the Markov regime-switching approach), employed a nonlinear probability model
instead of the more common linear speciﬁcation and did not attempt to deal with the main
problems of cross-country growth analysis - endogeneity and omitted variables. This section
attempts to, at least partially, address these issues.
B.1 Linear Regressions
Consider using a liner formulation for the model in (2). While a probability model seems
more appropriate for this problem, the linear model is more transparent and allows us to
easily exploit the panel nature of the data and use instrumental variables estimation. The
basic speciﬁcation is as follows
Pr(regime = j)i = Xi β + εi, (4)
where, as in the original speciﬁcation, Pr(regime = j) is the average of the estimated
likelihood of regime j during the sample period (1970-94, 1970-82 or 1983-94 depending
on the estimation method), and Xi is a vector of country speciﬁc characteristics including
initial income, quality of institutions and four policy measures: log of average inﬂation, real
exchange rate overvaluation, share of government’s consumption in GDP and trade to GDP
ratio.
The above equation is estimated separately for each of the four regimes; stable growth,
stagnation, miracle growth, and crisis. Table 9 shows the results using the 1970-1994 cross-
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section and instrumenting institutions with (log) settler mortality (see Acemoglu et al. 2001).
The ﬁrst column shows a standard growth regression where the dependent variable is the
average growth between 1970 and 1994. Institutions and overvaluation both aﬀect growth
signiﬁcantly, while the size of government is borderline signiﬁcant. As usual, controlling
for policies and institutions there is signiﬁcant convergence eﬀect. Overall, these result are
typical of what is obtained in the literature. They are also broadly consistent with the idea
that institutions are the fundamental determinant of growth and policies simply reﬂect their
quality.
The regime-probability regressions, however, tell a richer story and one that is similar to
the logit results above: the eﬀects of policies on the likelihood of diﬀerent growth regimes
are signiﬁcant even when institutions are included in the regression and these eﬀects diﬀer
across regimes in direction and magnitude. Again we ﬁnd the oﬀsetting eﬀects of trade and
government size and the opposite eﬀect of these two policies on the likelihood of a growth
acceleration.
Variable Avg. Growth Stable Growth Stagnation Crisis Miracle Growth
Rule of Law 0.041∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗ −0.345∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.136) (0.110) (0.056) (0.100)
Inﬂation 0.021 -0.024 -0.129 -0.035 0.188
(0.017) (0.178) (0.143) (0.073) (0.130)
Overvaluation −0.039∗∗∗ -0.224 0.234∗∗ 0.098∗ -0.108
(0.015) (0.159) (0.128) (0.065) (0.116)
Gov’t −0.139∗ 0.910 0.268 0.491 −1.669∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.984) (0.792) (0.403) (0.720)
Trade 0.017 −0.256∗ 0.074 -0.026 0.208∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.169) (0.136) (0.069) (0.124)
Initial Income −0.034∗∗∗ 0.034 0.113 0.027 −0.174∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.115) (0.093) (0.047) (0.084)
Obs. 54 51 51 51 51
Table 9: Cross Section 1970-94 using settler mortality to instrument for institutions. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels:* 5%, ** 1%.
Table 10 divides the sample period into two subperiods (1970-82 and 1983-94) and uses
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lagged values to instrument for policies.17 Table 11 uses a panel (1970-82 and 1983-94)
and clusters errors by country.18 The overall pattern of eﬀects is again very similar to the
nonlinear results, with generally less signiﬁcance in the IV case.
Variable Avg. Growth Stable Growth Stagnation Crisis Miracle Growth
Rule of Law 0.034∗∗∗ -0.034 −0.264∗∗ 0.002 0.296∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.873) (0.061) (0.965) (0.037)
Inﬂation -0.002 -0.533 0.111 0.200∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗
(0.912) (0.211) (0.719) (0.070) (0.046)
Overvaluation −0.049∗∗∗ 0.227 0.242 -0.087 −0.382∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.642) (0.424) (0.515) (0.030)
Gov’t -0.067 1.606 0.150 -0.068 -1.688
(0.609) (0.329) (0.890) (0.862) (0.232)
Trade 0.010 −0.405∗∗ 0.160 0.016 0.229∗
(0.352) (0.057) (0.113) (0.569) (0.129)
Initial Income −0.019∗∗∗ 0.148 0.021 0.009 −0.178∗∗
(0.034) (0.341) (0.813) (0.760) (0.081)
Obs. 42 42 42 42 42
Table 10: Cross Section 1983-94 using IV. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁ-
cance levels:* 5%, ** 1%.
We take the above results as suggestive that the main message of the paper, that policies
matter for regime probabilities even when institutions are included in the regression and, for
most variables, the magnitude and direction of eﬀects vary across regimes, is robust to the
choice of the estimation method. The issue of endogeneity and omission of relevant variables
is extremely diﬃcult to overcome in a cross-country growth framework. The limited attempt
at dealing with these issues here suggests that the main results are not driven by these
biases but clearly more work is needed. Ultimately, however, we think establishing even
partial correlations between institutions and policies on the one hand and the frequency
17Since our measure of institutional quality is constant we again use settler mortality as the instrument.
18Note the low R2 in the miracle growth regression in Table 11. It implies that institutions and policies
together have limited power for explaining episodes of very fast growth, as discussed above.
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Variable Avg. Growth Stable Growth Stagnation Crisis Miracle Growth
Rule of Law 0.012∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.003) (0.058) (0.035) (0.021) (0.033)
Inﬂation −0.009∗∗∗ -0.050 0.006 0.010 0.033
(0.003) (0.084) (0.043) (0.043) (0.031)
Overvaluation −0.018∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.084 -0.022
(0.006) (0.102) (0.072) (0.050) (0.047)
Gov’t -0.028 1.556∗∗∗ −0.568∗∗ 0.063 −1.051∗∗
(0.049) (0.635) (0.333) (0.397) (0.610)
Trade 0.005 −0.328∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.021 0.171∗∗
(0.007) (0.130) (0.077) (0.043) (0.102)
Initial Income −0.012∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗ -0.042 -0.018 −0.045∗
(0.003) (0.058) (0.041) (0.016) (0.028)
R2 0.31 0.55 0.58 0.38 0.13
N 118 110 110 110 110
Table 11: Panel. Errors clustered by country in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels:* 5%, **
1%.
of growth episodes on the other, is an important step forward in the new research of the
patterns of economic growth.
B.2 Regime Classiﬁcation
The above analysis relied on the particular model chosen to detect and classify growth
patterns - the Markov regime-switching approach with four regimes and the AR(1) within-
regime structure estimated by Jerzmanowski (2006). One can wonder to what extent the
results depend on this choice. To investigate the robustness of the ﬁndings to a diﬀerent
method for classifying growth patterns we consider an alternative based on the approaches
taken by Hausmann et al. (2005) and Jones and Olken (2008). We start by searching for
structural breaks in the growth process and then we categorize periods according to the
estimated trend growth between two breakpoints. In particular we estimate the following
model (we drop country subscripts for brevity)
yt = α + γt+ εt, (5)
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where yt is the logarithm of real output per worker in country i and α and γ are allowed
to change over time, i.e. undergo structural breaks. Using the Bai-Perron test we can then
detect the breaks and use the estimated trend growth γ to classify a period between two
breaks as either a stable growth, stagnation, crises, or miracle growth period. The fraction
of time spent in each regime can then be used in a logit regression like the one above and
the results compared. The obvious mapping would be between the estimated period trend
growth and the regime long run average growth rates from Table 1. The problem with
this approach is that we have to map a one dimensional measure (trend growth between
break points) into the four regimes that diﬀer along multiple dimensions (average long run
growth, volatility, persistence). Consider for example classifying a period as a regime of
stable growth (with average growth of 2% in the long run) when γ is greater than 1% and
less than 3%. This seems like a reasonable choice, however, recall that the stagnation regime
also displays occasional bursts of faster growth, which are, in the long run, oﬀset by equally
frequent episodes of decline. Because it ignores within-regime persistence, the structural
breaks test would likely pick out the bursts of growth and subsequent declines as separate
regimes. That is, a brief period of growth at around 2% per year followed by an oﬀsetting
decline would be classiﬁed as a separate episode of stable growth by the breaks approach but
would likely be counted as part of a longer spell of stagnation in the Markov regime-switching
framework. Additionally, since the number of years between breaks cannot be too small (in
the implementation below it is assumed to be no less than 5 years) we have very little chance
of detecting one-time growth shocks such as the crisis regime unless several occur in a streak.
Mindful of these diﬃculties we can however attempt to carry out the above exercise, that is
to classify periods based on the structural break model and to use the resulting frequencies
in the logit model. The classiﬁcation we adopt is as follows
Regime =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
Miracle Growth if γ > 0.055
Stable Growth if 0.013 < γ ≤ 0.055
Stagnation if −0.021 < γ ≤ 0.013
Crisis if γ ≤ −0.021
(6)
The choice of the cutoﬀ points was made so that the fraction of sample years in a regime
based on the structural break classiﬁcation is roughly equal to the average sample time
spent in that regime based on the Markov-switching model (9%, 50%, 33%, and 8% for the
miracle, stable, stagnation, and crisis regimes, respectively). Note the imperfection of this
mapping signalled above; some episodes of miracle growth, say with sustained growth of 5%
per year, are going to be classiﬁed as stable growth. Also bursts of moderate growth, which
occasionally occur in the stagnation regime, will be counted as stable growth. Similarly,
periods of decline, again an occasional feature of stagnation, will be classiﬁed as crises.
Finally, periods of sustained moderate growth slightly below 1.3% per year will be considered
stagnation while in the regime-switching model they would be classiﬁed as a high likelihood
of stable growth.
The results of the logit regression using the structural break regime frequencies are shown
in Table 12, which, as in Table 3, presents the marginal eﬀects evaluated at the median.
The most interesting results appear to be preserved; policies matter even when institu-
tions are accounted for, they have diﬀerential eﬀect on the frequency of the four regimes,
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Variable Stable Growth Stagnation Crisis Miracle Growth
Rule of Law 0.233** -0.208** -0.049** 0.024**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.012) (0.007)
Inﬂation 0.204** -0.171* 0.022** -0.055*
(0.071) (0.070) (0.008) (0.027)
Overvaluation -0.548** 0.450** 0.066** 0.032**
(0.075) (0.072) (0.015) (0.011)
Gov’t -0.138 1.053* -0.346** -0.570**
(0.464) (0.442) (0.110) (0.175)
Trade -0.264** 0.247** -0.006 0.023**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.031) (0.007)
Initial Income -0.147** 0.148** 0.020* -0.022**
(0.027) (0.027) (0.009) (0.005)
Table 12: Multinomial logit: marginal eﬀects at the median. Standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels:* 5%, ** 1%.
the eﬀects of government size and trade on the chances of miracle growth go in opposite
directions. Moreover, policies have oﬀsetting eﬀects; government size discourages crises at
the expense of periods of fast growth while trade sacriﬁces stable moderate growth but in-
creases the likelihood of miracle growth. There also appear to be several notable diﬀerences
from Table 3. First, the signs on the eﬀect of government size change; the eﬀect on the
probability of stable growth becomes negative and insigniﬁcant and that on the likelihood
of stagnation turns positive. A similar change of direction occurs for the eﬀect of initial
income; the sign on the likelihood of stable growth goes from positive to negative and that
on stagnation becomes positive. The most likely explanation for these changes is the fact
that the classiﬁcation based on the cutoﬀ points in (6) confounds some of the regimes; in
particular, as already pointed out, the new stable growth periods are likely to include a num-
ber of episodes of miracle growth as well as the growth-bursts parts of stagnations, the new
stagnation periods are likely to include episodes of stable growth, and the new crisis regime
includes periods of sustained decline, previously classiﬁed as part of the stagnation regime.
This implies that, for example, the original stagnation regime is a combination of the present
stagnation and crises regimes, which makes the eﬀects of trade and government in the two
speciﬁcations even more similar. In summary, we view the above results as suggestive that
the method chosen for ﬁnding and classifying growth episodes is not driving the main results
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of the paper.
C The EM Algorithm
This section of the appendix describes the estimation algorithm. First we explain the basic
idea using a simpliﬁed model. Later the speciﬁcation estimated in Jerzmanowski (2006) is
presented.
C.1 A simple case
Consider estimating a model for only one country. We start by assuming the following
process for the growth rate of output per worker. To avoid notational clutter we drop the
“hats” from y′s.
yt = αst + βstyt−1 + ε
st
t , (7a)
εstt ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2st), (7b)
Every period a country can switch between regimes. Assume that this transition is
governed by an 2-state Markov process. That is st ∈ {1, 2} and
P{st = j | st−1 = i, st−2 = k, ...} =
P{st = j | st−1 = i} ≡ pij .
That is the probability distribution over next periods states depends on the history of
states only through the current state. Suppose further that the transition probabilities
depend on a the value of an exogenous variable z,
P{st = j | st−1 = i} ≡ pij(z).
The particular functional for assumed is19
pst1(z) =
exp(z′λst1)
1 + exp(z′λst1)
,
pst2(z) = 1− pst1(z).
for st = 1, 2
W can collect the coeﬃcient as follows. Let γs = (αs, βs, σ
2
s )
′ and μs = λs1 for s = 1, 2,
and γ = (γ′1, γ
′
2, γ
′
3)
′ , μ = (μ1, μ2, μ3)′. Finally we can collect all the parameters in one
vector θ = (γ′, μ′)′.
Let the density function for observation t be f(yt, st|z; θ). Also let Yt = (yt, yt−1, ..., y0)
be the all observations on y through period t and denote by St = (st, st−1, ..., s0) the cor-
responding history of unobserved states. The the likelihood function for the data can be
written as
19Note that with only one country and time-invariant z we could equally well treat the transition proba-
bilities as parameters. Of course, later we introduce multiple countries and thus variation in z. To keep the
notation similar we therefore introduce z in this section
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Lk(YT , ST |z; θ) = f(y0, s0|z; θ)
T∏
t=1
f(yt, st|yt−1, st−1, z; θ)
= f(y0|s0, z; θ)P (s0)
T∏
t=1
f(yt|st, yt−1, st−1, z; θ)P (st|yt−1, st−1, z; θ)
= f(y0|s0; γ)P (s0)
T∏
t=1
f(yt|st, yt−1; γ)P (st|st−1, z;μ),
where P (st|st−1, z;μ) are elements of the transition probability matrix. The third line makes
use of the following facts: P ’s do not depend on lagged y, they only depend on parameters in
μ, conditional on the current state s the likelihood of y does not depend on the past states,
and it only depends on parameters in γ. We take the initial distribution of states to be equal
to the P (s0) = (1/2, 1/2, ).
The above expression is referred to as complete-data likelihood function because to be
evaluated it requires the knowledge of the history of y’s as well as the history of states.
Following Diebold at al 1994 it can be written in terms of indicator functions as follows.
L(YT , ST |z; θ) =(I(s0 = 1)f(y0|s0 = 1; γ1)ρ1 + I(s0 = 2)f(y0|s0 = 2; γ2)ρ2) +
×
T∏
t=1
{
f(yt|st = 1, yt−1; γ1)I(st = 1, st−1 = 1)p11(z, yt−1;μ1) +
f(yt|st = 2, yt−1; γ2)I(st = 2, st−1 = 1)p12(z, yt−1;μ1) +
f(yt|st = 1, yt−1; γ1)I(st = 1, st−1 = 2)p21(z, yt−1;μ2) +
f(yt|st = 2, yt−1; γ2)I(st = 2, st−1 = 2)p22(z, yt−1;μ2)
}
.
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The log likelihood is then given by
logL(YT , ST |z; θ) =I(s0 = 1) log(f(y0|s0 = 1; γ1)ρ1) + (L)
I(s0 = 2) log(f(y0|s0 = 2; γ2)ρ2) +
+
T∑
t=1
{
I(st = 1) log f(yt|st = 1, yt−1; γ1) +
I(st = 2) log f(yt|st = 2, yt−1; γ2) +
I(st = 1, st−1 = 1) log p11(z, yt−1;μ1) +
I(st = 2, st−1 = 1) log p12(z, yt−1;μ1) +
I(st = 1, st−1 = 2) log p21(z, yt−1;μ2) +
I(st = 2, st−1 = 2) log p22(z, yt−1;μ2)
}
.
This log-likelihood function cannot be evaluated without the knowledge of the history of
states.However an incomplete-data log-likelihood function can be obtained by summing over
all possible state histories. This function could then be maximized numerically to ﬁnd the
ML estimate of θ. In practice however, this procedure would be extremely computationally
demanding. An alternative way to estimate θ is by a variant of the EM algorithm. See
Hamilton (1994).
The algorithm iterates on two steps until convergence is attained. The limit of the
iteration can be show to be the ML estimate.
The algorithm starts with a guess of the vector of parameters θˆ0. Given this guess we can
form inference about the state history, i.e. we can calculate probabilities of st = 1 and st = 2
for every t. This is done combining the information from f(yt|st, z; θˆ0) and the transition
probabilities pij(z; θˆ
0) (see Hamilton 1994) and it simply tells us what is the probability
that an observation yt was generated by a given state if the parameters of the process are
θˆ0. Denote by Pˆ (st = j|Yτ ; θˆ0) the inference about st based on observations on y through
period τ . If we use the entire sample to infer state sequence the resulting probabilities
Pˆ (st = j|YT ; θˆ0) are called smoothed probabilities of the state history. We can the replace
the indicator functions in the complete-data likelihood above by the smoothed probabilities
and evaluate an expected log-likelihood function. For example
I(st = 1) = Pˆ (st = 1|YT , z; θˆ0) (8)
I(st = 1, st−1 = 2) = Pˆ (st = 1, st−1 = 2|YT , z; θˆ0)
We can then maximize this expected log-likelihood to ﬁnd an updated estimate of the pa-
rameter vector θˆ1.20 Theses steps are repeated starting with θˆ1. The iterations are continued
20The ML estimates of γ are linear ML estimates on data weighted by a function of the smoothed proba-
47
until a chosen convergence criterion is met.
C.2 Multiple countries and four regimes
The model estimated in the paper allows for four regimes and uses data on multiple countries.
The estimation strategy is identical to the one above. The complete data log-likelihood for
country k in terms of indicator functions is given by
logLk(YkT , SkT |zk; θ) =I(sk0 = 1) log(f(yk0|sk0 = 1; γ1)ρ1) + (Lk)
I(sk0 = 2) log(f(yk0|sk0 = 2; γ2)ρ2) +
I(sk0 = 3) log(f(yk0|sk0 = 3; γ3)ρ3) +
I(sk0 = 4) log(f(yk0|sk0 = 4; γ4)ρ4) +
bilities (see Hamilton 1996). The estimates of μ cannot be expressed in a closed form and must be obtained
by solving numerically a system of nonlinear equations.
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T∑
t=1
{
I(skt = 1) log f(ykt|skt = 1, ykt−1; γ1) +
I(skt = 2) log f(ykt|skt = 2, ykt−1; γ2) +
I(skt = 3) log f(ykt|skt = 3, ykt−1; γ3) +
I(skt = 4) log f(ykt|skt = 4, ykt−1; γ4) +
I(skt = 1, skt−1 = 1) log p11(zk, ykt−1;μ1) +
I(skt = 2, skt−1 = 1) log p12(zk, ykt−1;μ1) +
I(skt = 3, skt−1 = 1) log p13(zk, ykt−1;μ1) +
I(skt = 4, skt−1 = 1) log p14(zk, ykt−1;μ1) +
I(skt = 1, skt−1 = 2) log p21(zk, ykt−1;μ2) +
I(skt = 2, skt−1 = 2) log p22(zk, ykt−1;μ2) +
I(skt = 3, skt−1 = 2) log p23(zk, ykt−1;μ2) +
I(skt = 4, skt−1 = 2) log p24(zk, ykt−1;μ2) +
I(skt = 1, skt−1 = 3) log p31(zk, ykt−1;μ3) +
I(skt = 2, skt−1 = 3) log p32(zk, ykt−1;μ3) +
I(skt = 3, skt−1 = 3) log p33(zk, ykt−1;μ3) +
I(skt = 4, skt−1 = 3) log p34(zk, ykt−1;μ3) +
I(skt = 1, skt−1 = 4) log p41(zk, ykt−1;μ4) +
I(skt = 2, skt−1 = 4) log p42(zk, ykt−1;μ4) +
I(skt = 3, skt−1 = 4) log p43(zk, ykt−1;μ4) +
I(skt = 4, skt−1 = 4) log p44(zk, ykt−1;μ4)
}
.
The complete-data of the entire sample of K countries is given by
logL(YT , ST |Z; θ) =
K∑
k=1
{
logLk(YkT , SkT |zk; θ)
}
. (9)
The initial distribution of states is assumed to be (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4) and the EM algo-
rithm is used to ﬁnd the ML estimate of θ in a way analogous to the simple case described
above.
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